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LITIGANT RESPONSIBILITY: FEDERAL RULE
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11 AND ITS
APPLICATION
The fundamental goal of federal civil procedure is to secure the speedy and inex-
pensive determination of every action on the merits) This goal underlies the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and federal courts have held that each rule must be construed
in accordance with it. 2 In this way the rules promote effective and just adjudications
Many judges and commentators contend that litigant irresponsibility impedes the
attainment of the goal of securing a speedy and inexpensive resolution on the merits: ,
This irresponsibility or abuse often assumes the form of frivolous lawsuits and combative
motion practices, which increase costs and delay and obstruct justices Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 11 was enacted to address the problem of litigant irresponsibility. 6
I FED. R. Civ. P. 1. Rule 1 reads as follows:
These rules govern the procedure in the United States district courts in all suits of a
civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity or in admiralty, with the
exceptions stated in Rule 81. They shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action.
Id, See also Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181-82 (1962); Brennan v. O'Donnell, 426 F.2d 218, 221
(5th Cir. 1970); Woodfork By and Through Houston v. Gavin, 105 F.R.D. 100, 103 (N.D. Miss.
1985).
United States v. Pinto, 44 F.R.D. 357, 359 (W.D. Mich. 1968). See also Schaedler v. Reading
Eagle Publication, Inc., 370 F.2d 795, 798 (3d Cir. 1967); United States v. Purdome, 30 F.R.D. 338,
339-40 (W.D. Mo. 1962).
3 See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957); Brennan, 426 F.2d at 221. See also C. WRIGHT &
A. MILLER, FEDERAL. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1029 (1969).
See, e.g., Burger Urges Fines for Frivolous Suits, Boston Globe, Dec. 30, 1985, at 3, col. 2; Miller,
The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV. I, 17 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Miller,
The Adversary System]; Schwarzcr, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule II — a Closer Look, 104 F.R.D.
181, 182 (1985). See also Burnett v. Grattan, 105 S. Ct. 2924, 2930 n.I3 (1984). See generally W.
MCLAUCHLAN, FEDERAL COURT CASELOADS 1-3 (1984); Soafer, Sanctioning Attorneys for Discovery
Abuse Under the New Federal Rules: On the Limited Utility of Punishment, 57 ST, JOHN'S L. REV. 680
(1983).
" See, e.g., Miller, The Adversary System, supra note 4, at 17; Underwood, Curbing Litigation Abuses:
Judicial Control of Adversary Ethics — the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Proposed Amendments
to the Rules of Civil Procedure, 56 ST. Jouv's L. REV. 625, 626-28 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Underwood, Curbing Litigation Abuses]. See also McMillan & Siegel, Creating a Fast-Track Alternative
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 NoTRE DAME LAW. 431, 432-33 (1985).
" FED. R. Civ. P. l I; FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note. Rule 11 reads as follows:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall
be signed by at least one attorney GI record in his individual name, whose address
shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading,
motion, or other paper and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically
provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit.
The rule in equity that the averments of an answer under oath must be overcome by
the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness sustained by corroborating circum-
stances is abolished. The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by
him that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry it is well
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the
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Rule 11 seeks to deter abusive practices and to streamline litigation by decreasing
ineritless claims and defenses. 7 The rule requires the signer of a paper to accept re-
sponsibility for his or her document. 9 The signature certifies that to the best of the
signer's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry, the paper
is factually and legally warranted and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose. 9
According to the rule, a court shall sanction an attorney, or a party proceeding pro se,
for signing a paper in violation of the rule.L° The rule provides that the court shall
impose an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay expenses incurred
by one's opponent, including a reasonable attorney's fee."
This note will examine Rule II, as amended in 1983, and will survey the federal
courts' application of the rule. The first section will briefly examine the former version
of Rule II as background to the current rule. The second section will discuss the current
rule's new standard of conduct, a standard of reasonableness under the circumstances,°
and will survey the federal courts' application of that standard. The third section will
discuss the current rule's provisions for enforcing the new standard of conduct. This
discussion will examine and survey Rule 11's sanctions: their mandatory nature, appro-
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for
any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed,
it shall he stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the
attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in
violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose
upon the person who signed it, a represented party, Or both, an appropriate sanction,
which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the
reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other
paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
/ FED. R. Cry. P. 11 advisory committee note.
g See FED. R. Ctv, P. 11; FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note. This note will use the term
"paper" to include pleadings, motions, and other papers.
9 FED. R. Civ. P. I I. The language of the amended rule is ambiguous on at least one point. A
reasonable inquiry must inform a signer's belief that a pleading, motion, or other paper is well
grounded in fact and warranted by existing law or by a good-faith argument for a change in existing
law. But must a reasonable inquiry also inform a signer's belief as to the purpose of a pleading,
motion or other paper? At least one court suggests that the requirement of reasonable inquiry also
. applies to the purpose of a pleading, motion, or other paper. Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d
1168, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (court may impose sanctions if a reasonable inquiry discloses that the
pleading, motion, or paper is "(1) not well grounded in fact, (2) not warranted by existing law or a
good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, or (3) interposed
for any improper purpose such as harassment or delay"). Most courts, however, suggest that the
signer certifies only that a reasonable inquiry informs his or her belief as to the facts and the law.
See, e.g., Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1986); Eastway Constr.
Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253-54 (2d Cir. 1985); McLaughlin v. Western Casualty
and SLIT. Co., 603 F. Supp. 978, 981 (S.D. Ala. 1985). The advisory committee note to the amended
rule supports the majority view: "Itlhe new language stresses the need for some prefiling inquiry
into both the facts and the law to satisfy the affirmative duty imposed by the rule." FED. R. Civ. P.
11 advisory committee note.
in FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
11 Id.
12 See FED. R. CR,. P. 11 advisory committee note; Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 829; Westmoreland, 770
F.2d at 1177; Davis v. Veslan Enter., 765 F.2d 494, 499-500 (5th Cir. 1985).
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priateness, and application to attorney and client. The note will conclude that, as cases
interpreting Rule 11 since it was amended in 1983 indicate, the rule effectively furthers
the purpose of deterring litigation abuses and streamlining litigation without stifling
creative and zealous advocacy.
1. THE FORMER VERSION OF RULE 11
Rule 11 was amended in 1983 because it had failed to deter abuses in the signing
of pleadings. 13 To understand the change in Rule 11, it is necessary to examine the rule's .
predecessor." Rule 11's predecessor required that all pleadings' be signed by an attorney
of record 16 or by a party, if unrepresented." By signing a pleading, an attorney ' s certified
that he had read it" and "that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief there
is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.""
Uncertainty arose as to the standard of conduct imposed by the former rule." First,
the former rule did not specify whether the required "good ground of support" had to
' 3 FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note.
" Former Rule 11 read as follows:
Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one
attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who
is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading and state his address. Except
when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified
or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an answer under
oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness sustained
by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature of an attorney constitutes
a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed
for delay. If a pleading is not signed or is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of
this rule, it may be stricken as sham and false and the action may proceed as though
the pleading had not been served. For a willful violation of this rule an attorney may
be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action. Similar action may be taken if scan-
dalous or indecent matter is inserted.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11,28 U.S.C. app. 540-41 (1982).
' 5 The former rule's caption and text referred only to pleadings, but motions and other papers
were incorporated by reference in Rule 7(b)(2). FED. R. Civ. P. 7(6)(2), 28 U.S.C. app. 537 (1982).
10 Id. The phrase ''attorney of record" is ambiguous. As one commentator asks, "Wipes this
mean that an attorney must have filed a formal appearance to be subject to the signature require-
ment, or that by complying with the signature requirement an attorney becomes an attorney of
record?" Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems with Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 11. 61 MINN. L. REV. 1, 7 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Risinger, Some Striking
Problems]. Because the thrust of the current rule is to make the signer responsible for the filing, the
latter interpretation seems correct. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note. The litigant's
signature identifies the signer as someone whom the court may hold responsible for the paper. See
Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 830.
' 7 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11,28 U.S.C. app. 540 (1982).
' 6 Under the terms of the former rule, the certification requirement applied only to attorneys.
Fed. R. Civ. I'. 11, 28 U.S.C. app. 540-41 (1982).
19 Id. Current Rule 11 also requires the signer to certify that he has read the paper. FED. R.
Civ. P. 11. See supra note 6 for the text of current Rule 1 i. The apparent purpose of this
requirement is to preclude the use of ignorance as an excuse. See Schwarzer, supra note 4, at 186-
87.
xu Fed. R. Civ. P. II, 28 U.S.C. app. 540 (1982).
21 FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note.
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be factual, legal, or both. 22 Moreover, because good ground of support is a nebulous
concept resistant to definition," judicial interpretations of the good-ground standard
differed markedly." Most significantly, perhaps, phrases such as "to the best of his
knowledge, information and belief," "intent to defeat," and "willful violation" suggested
that an attorney could satisfy the rule by signing a pleading with an honest belief that
there were good grounds for it." Courts interpreting the former rule construed the
rule's certification requirement subjectively: an attorney could satisfy the rule by certi-
fying that, to his personal knowledge, information, and belief, there were good grounds
for the pleading. 26 Consequently, the courts held that a willful violation, or bad faith,
was a prerequisite for subjecting an attorney to disciplinary action. 27
Uncertainty also arose as to when sanctions should be imposed on an attorney and
as to the nature of the sanctions authorized by the rule. 28 The former rule did not direct
courts to sanction attorneys who violated its provisions. 29 Rather, under the old rule, the
decision to sanction a violation and the selection of an appropriate sanction were left to
the discretion of the court." The rule provided little guidance to courts regarding the
nature and appropriateness of sanctions: "fflor a willful violation of this rule an attorney
may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action. Similar action may be taken if
scandalous or indecent matter is inserted."" In effect, enforcement of the rule was
permissive.
The framers of the 1983 amendment to Rule I I intended to make the signer of a
paper accept responsibility for the contents of his paper and the consequences of filing
it by encouraging courts to use the rule." The framers sought to accomplish this by
clarifying the rule's standard of conduct and the means of enforcing that standard." As
the advisory note states, "[t]tle new language is intended to reduce the reluctance of
courts to impose sanctions ... by emphasizing the responsibilities of the attorney and
reenforcing those obligations by the imposition of sanctions.""
22 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 28 U.S.C. app. 540-41 (1982).
23 See Risinger, Some Striking Problems, supra note 16, at 9-14.
24 See, e.g., Kinee v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Savings Sc Loan Ass'n, 365 F. Supp. 975, 982-83
(E.D. Pa. 1973) (pleading must have a reasonable basis of support); Heart Disease Research Found.
v. General Motors Corp., 15 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1517, 1519 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (pleading
requires an honest belief that there are facts and law to support it); Murchison v. Kirby, 27 F.R.D.
14, 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (pleading should be stricken only when it appears beyond peradventure that
it is sham, false and devoid of factual basis).
23 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 28 U.S.C. app. 540-41 (1982); Heart Disease, 15 Fed. R. Serv. 2d at
1519.
26 See Hear! Disease, 15 Fed. R. Serv. 2d at 1519. See also Badillo v. Central Steel & Wire Co.,
717 F.2d 1160, 1167 (7[11 Cir. 1983); Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 350 (2d Cir. 1980); Kinee
v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n, 365 F. Supp. 975, 982-83 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
27 See, e.g., Badillo, 717 F.2d at 1167; Nemeroff, 620 F.2d at 350-51. See also Mohammed v. Union
Carbide Corp., 606 F. Supp. 252, 260 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
28 FED. R. CR'. P. I I advisory committee note. See also Risinger, Some Striking Problems, supra
note 16, at 14-17.
29 Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 1, 28 U.S.C. app. 540-41 (1982).
3,
 Id,
' 1 Id. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note.
32
 FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note. See FED. R. Cry. P. 11.
35 See FED. R. Cry. P. 11 advisory committee note.
" Id.
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II. RULE I I's NEW STANDARD OF CONDUCT
A. The Objective Standard of Reasonableness Under the Circumstances
The current rule's standard of conduct contrasts sharply with that of its predeces-
sor. 35 As amended in 1983, Rule 11 requires an attorney or party to certify that a
reasonable inquiry informs his or her belief that a paper is factually and legally warranted
and that the paper is not interposed for any improper purpose. 36 The current rule's
elimination of the willful violation requirement and its new requirement of reasonable
inquiry indicate that the rule's framers intended to make the standard of conduct an
objective one. 37 Furthermore, courts applying the current rule uniformly have employed
an objective test by examining the circumstances of the case rather than the mental state
or intent of the litigant or attorney. 36
Eastway Construction Corp. v. City of New York," a 1985 decision by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, illustrates the use of the objective standard of
reasonable inquiry." Eastway was a general contractor engaged in publicly financed
housing construction in New York City. 11 The city instituted a new policy under which
it forbade companies under city supervision from contracting with firms in default:12
Because Eastway's principals had defaulted on low-interest loans made by the city, 43 the
new city policy put Eastway out of business." Eastway challenged the new policy in the
New York state courts, but 1051. 13
Eastway then brought an action against the city and other defendants in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York:16 alleging that the defendants
had conspired to injure Eastway's trade in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 47 In
"Compare FED. R. CD'. P. 11 with Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 28 U.S.C. app. 540-41 (1982).
36 FEE). R. CRY. I'. 11. Sec supra note 6 for text of current Rule 1 1.
37 See FED. R. Civ. I'. 11; FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee note. See also Frazier v. Cast,
771 F.2d 259, 263 (7th Cir. 1985); Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2t1 243, 253-
54 (2d Cir. 1985); Weir V. Lehman Newspapers, Inc., 105 F.R.D. 574, 576 (D. Colo. 1985); Mc-
Laughlin v. Western Casualty and Sur. Co., 603 F. Supp. 978, 982 & n.2 (S.D. Ala. 1985).
"See, e.g., Frazier, 771 F.2d at 263-65; Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d 1168, 1177 (D.C.
Cir. 1985); Eastway, 762 F.2d at 253-54; McLaughlin, 603 F. Supp. at 981-82.
In August, 1984, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided a case
that arose under old Rule l 1, Suslick v. Rothschild Sec. Corp., 741 F.2d 1000, 1002 (7th Cir. 1984).
The Suslick court mistakenly cited the text of the current Rule 11 in a footnote. See id. at 1003 n.3.
See also In re Ronco, Inc., 105 F.R.D. 493, 497 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (court notes the Suslick error). This
mistake has created some confusion, because at least one court, following Suslick's error, seems to
have interpreted Rule II subjectively. See Marco Holding Co. v. Lear Siegler, Inc., 606 F. Supp.
204, 215 (D.C. Ill. 1985). In a recent case, the Seventh Circuit expressly disavowed any subjective
interpretation of Rule I I. Frazier, 771 F.2c1 at 265 n.9. The Frazier court noted that it had decided
Suslick under the former rule. Id.
"762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985).
4° Id. at 253-54.
Id. at 246.
42 Id.
45 Id.
14 Id.
45 Id. at 247.
46 Id. at 248.
47 Id.
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this action, however, Eastway failed to allege the elements of an antitrust claim." For
example, Eastway did not allege any facts evidencing concerted action by the defendants,
who were non-competitors." Furthermore, Eastway failed to allege an antitrust injury,
or anticompetitive effect." The district court granted summary judgment to the defen-
dants, but denied defendants' Rule I I motion for attorneys' fees."
The court of appeals reversed that part of the judgment denying defendants' Rule
11 motion for attorneys' fees. 52 The court held that Eastway's counsel had violated Rule
11 because after reasonable inquiry a competent attorney would not have pursued the
antitrust claim." While recognizing that Eastway may not have brought its antitrust claim
in bad faith," the court concluded that the new rule establishes an objective, not a
subjective, standard of conduct." In applying this new standard to the case before it,
the court stated that "[Eastway's] claim of an antitrust violation by non-competitors,
without any allegation of an antitrust injury, was destined to fail. Moreover, a competent
attorney, after reasonable inquiry, would have had to reach the same conclusion."56
Thus, the Second Circuit held that the district court erred in denying defendants' Rule
11 motion for attorneys' fees."
At least two courts have expanded the requirement of objectively reasonable inquiry
by ruling that the requirement is continuous and survives the filing of the paper." For
example, in the 1985 case of Woodfork By and Through Houston v. Gavin," the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi ruled that a signer must
continually review and reassess his position in light of subsequently acquired information
and knowledge." A signer's failure to conduct such a re-appraisal may not constitute
reasonable inquiry and, thus, may violate Rule 11. 61
B. Rule 11 's Three -Pronged Test
Under Rule I l's new standard of conduct, an objectively reasonable inquiry must
reveal that a paper is well grounded in fact (factual prong), warranted by existing law
or a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law
(legal prong), and the paper must not be interposed for any improper purpose (moti-
vational prong). 62 Thus, the current rule requires the signer of a paper to certify that
48 Id, at 250.
49 Id. at 250,251 n.5.
5° Id. at 250-51.
M Id. at 246.
52 Id. at 254. The court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment. Id.
53 Id. at 253-54.
54 Id. at 254.
' 5 Id. at 253-54.
56 Id. at 254.
" Id.
58 Erie Conduit Corp. v. Metropolitan Asphalt Paving Ass'n, 106 F.R.D. 451,456-57 (E.D.N.Y.
1985); Woodfork By and Through Houston v. Gavin, 105 F.R.D. 100,104 (N.D. Miss. 1985). The
advisory committee note refers to the time the paper is submitted. FED. R. CIA/. P. 11 advisory
committee note. Rule 11 itself is silent on this issue. Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. See supra note 6 for the
text of current Rule 11.
93 105 F.R.D. 100 (N.D. Miss. 1985).
60 Id. at 104.
61 Id.
62 FED. R. CR, . P. II. See supra note 6 for the text of current Rule 11.
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the paper meets this three-pronged test." Accordingly, the courts are deciding what
would be reasonable to believe about the facts, the law, and the purpose underlying a
paper. 64
1. Well Grounded in Fact
Because a reasonable inquiry must reveal that a paper is well grounded in fact," a
signer cannot satisfy Rule 11's factual prong by relying solely on his personal interpre-
tation of facts or on conclusory allegations of fact." For example, in Davis v. Veslan
Enterprises, 67 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district
court's order sanctioning an attorney under Rule 11, in part because a reasonable inquiry
would have revealed that the attorney's paper was not well grounded in fact." In Davis,
a tractor-trailer ran a traffic signal and killed a young man." The plaintiff, decedent's
mother, a Texas resident, sued two Texas defendants in a Texas state court." Plaintiff
later added two non-Texas residents as defendants." During his closing argument,
plaintiff's counsel maintained that the nonresident defendants were primarily liable.'"
The jury exonerated the Texas defendants, and awarded plaintiff $13 million in com-
pensatory and punitive damages against the out-of-state defendants."
On the day before a hearing on plaintiff's motion for judgment on the verdict, one
of the out-of-state defendants petitioned for removal to federal court on grounds of
diversity. 74 The'petition for removal prevented the state court from entering judgment."
Because Texas law allowed interest to accrue only from the date of entry of judgment,
the defendant benefited financially by delaying the entry of judgment." The defendant
argued that the plaintiff had abandoned her claim against the Texas defendants by
telling the jury that they were not guilty," and that because only the claim against the
nonresident defendants remained, the petition for removal was proper."
The court of appeals agreed with the district court that the defendant's petition for
removal violated Rule 1 1." According to the court of appeals, an objectively reasonable
inquiry revealed that defendant's counsel could not have believed that the plaintiff had
63 See FED. R. CR% P. 11; Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d 1168,1174 (D.G. Cir. 1985).
1 i 4 See, e.g., Westmoreland, 770 F.2d at 1177; Davis v. Veslan Enter., 765 F.2d 494,497-500 (5th
Cir. 1985); McLaughlin, 603 F. Supp. at 981-82.
65 FED. R. Civ. P. 11. See supra note 6 for the text of current Rule 11.
66 See Davis, 765 F.2d at 498-99 (defendant's interpretation of plaintiff's closing argument not
well grounded in fact). See also Frazier, 771 F.2d at 263 (allegation based on deposition testimony
not well grounded in fact).
"7 765 F.2d 494 (5th Cr. 1985).
68 Id. at 498-500.
69 Id. at 495.
7° Id.
71 Id.
" Id. at 499.
" Id. at 496.
74 Id.
" Id.
7t;
77 Id.
78 Id .
79 Id. at 498-500.
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abandoned her claim against the Texas defendants. 80
 The court found that defendant's
petition for removal was not well grounded in fact. 81
 The court's examination of the
plaintiff's closing argument disclosed that plaintiff had not exonerated anyone. 62 Rather,
according to the court, the plaintiff had merely focused on the out-of-state defendants
by stating that an accident can have many causes, but that the nonresidents were most
responsible for the accident.°' Thus, the Davis court indicated that the signer's belief in
his factual allegation must be objectively credible.°4
Although the paper must be well grounded in fact, the advisory committee note to
Rule 1 1 states that the signer may rely on another person's information or investigation. 85
Courts have concluded, however, that the evidence upon which the signer relies must
be sufficient to sustain a reasonable belief.'" Therefore, the signer often may have to
conduct some independent investigation to verify his or her belief, especially if additional
evidence is readily available."
2. Legally Warranted
Under Rule 1 l's legal prong, a reasonable inquiry must inform a signer's belief that
his or her paper is warranted by existing law or by a good-faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law." For example, one court has applied
the legal prong by ruling that a signer may violate Rule 11 by failing to discover
controlling law." If a signer fails to uncover the controlling law when a reasonable
inquiry would disclose it, the signer violates Rule 1 1. 90
 District courts have held that the
signer's inquiry is not reasonable if the law is discoverable by using the resources available
to him or her. 9 ' For example, failure to use basic legal research tools, such as citators,
digests, and annotated codes may not constitute reasonable inquiry.92 Similarly, failure
to conduct a computerized search, if available to the signer, may not be reasonable
inquiry."
" Id. at 497-500. The district court granted plaintiff's motion for remand to the state court.
Id. at 496. The district court also granted plaintiff's Rule 11 motion for attorneys' fees incurred in
contesting defendant's motion for remand, as well as interest accrued because of the delay in entry
of the state court judgment. Id.
"' Id. at 496-97.
" Id. at 499.
" Id.
"I See id. The court of appeals upheld the sanction that the district court imposed, including
interest accrued because of the delay in entry of the state court judgment. Id. at 499-500.
85
 FED. R. Clv. P. 11 advisory committee note.
"" See, e.g., Frazier, 771 F.2d at 263-65; Florida Monument Builders v. All Faiths Mem. Gardens,
605 F. Stipp. 1324, 1326-27 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
87 See Florida Monument Builders, 605 F. Supp. at 1326-27 (facts revealed that plaintiff relied on
an attorney's beliefs and experience and failed to conduct an independent investigation before
filing complaint, even though plaintiff could easily have conducted such an investigation).
88
 FED. R. Civ. P. 11. See supra note 6 for the text of current Rule 11.
" See McLaughlin, 603 F. Stipp. at 980-82 (petition for removal not filed within 30 days, as
required by statute).
99 See Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 103 F.R.D. 124, 128-29 (N.D. Cal. 1984)
(counsel could have discovered controlling law by shepardizing principal authority).
91
 See, e.g., Blake By and Through Blake v. National Casualty Co., 607 F. Supp. 189, 191 n.4
(C.D. Cal. 1984); Golden Eagle, 103 F.R.D. at 128-29.
92 See Blake, 607 F. Supp. at 191 n.4.
"See Golden Eagle, 103 F.R.D. at 128-29. In Golden Eagle. the defendant moved to dismiss
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Some courts have held that a signer also violates the rule's legal prong by misapplying
the law when a reasonable inquiry would have revealed the correct application." Ac-
cording to these courts, such a paper is not warranted by existing law.'35 In Davis, for
example, a reasonable inquiry would have revealed that a retrial in federal court was
impossible because of lack of diversity.""
A paper not warranted by existing law may be warranted by a good-faith argument
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.°7 At. least two courts have
ruled that. the paper must make it clear that the argument is being presented as an
extension, modification, or reversal of law and not as an argument warranted by existing
law. 99 Thus, a litigant may not be able to advance an argument that qualifies as a good-
faith attempt to extend, modify, or reverse the law as if it were an argument warranted
by existing law." As one court has noted, when a litigant submits a paper purporting to
be warranted by existing law but misapplies the law, and a reasonable inquiry would
have revealed the law's correct application, the litigant may violate the rule even if a
good-faith argument for changing the law could have been made."'"
Despite the subjective connotation of "good faith argument,"mi the courts have
interpreted this phrase objectively." The issue is whether a reasonable inquiry would
reveal a good-faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse the law." As the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently ruled, a claim is meritless and
violates Rule 11 if an examination of the facts and law reveals that the claim does not
constitute a good-faith argument for change.°' The Ninth Circuit stated, "the conclusion
drawn from the research undertaken must ... be defensible." 105 As one district court
has noted, however, determining whether a claim is so meritless that the argument for
it does not constitute a defensible good-faith argument is a difficult task requiring
plaintiff's claim for economic loss arising from negligent manufacture. Id. at 125. In support of
the motion to dismiss, defendant cited a 1965 decision, but ['ailed to cite more recent adverse
authority. Id. at 128-29. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California
directed counsel for defendant to submit a memorandum explaining why Rule 11 sanctions should
not be imposed. Id. at 125. In the Rule I memorandum, counsel for defendant cited a Lexis copy
of unreported decisions as authority supporting the motion to dismiss. Id. at 129. The court noted
that counsel's ability to find supporting authority by using Lexis indicated that he or she had the
capacity to find adverse authority and that the previous failure to do so was inexcusable. Id.
94 Westmoreland, 770 F.2d at 1175-78 (reasonable inquiry would have revealed that a deposition
subpoena is not a court order compelling a witness to testify). See also Davis, 765 F.2d at 498-500.
", See Westmoreland, 770 F.2d at 1175-78. See also Davis, 765 F.2c1 at 499.
96 Davis, 765 F.2d at 499.
97 FED. R. CR% P. 11. See supra note 6 for the text of current Rule 11.
99 See Golden Eagle, 103 F.R.D. at 126-28; WSB Elec. v. Rank & File Comm. to Stop 2-Cate
Sys., 103 F.R.D. 417, 420 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
99 Golden Eagle, 103 F.R.D. at 127.
100 Id. at 125-27.
1 {) 1 FED. R. Cm P. 11. See supra note 6 for the text of current Rule 11.
1 " See, e.g., Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 831; Weir v. Lehman Newspapers, Inc., 105 F.R.D. 574, 576
(D. Colo. 1985). See also Westmoreland, 770 F.2cl at 1174; Eastway, 762 F.2d at 253-54. But see Pudlo
v. Director, I.R.S., 587 F. Supp. 1010, 1011 (N.D. 111. 1984).
LOS See FED. R. Ctv. P. 11. See also Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 831. In Zaldivar, the Ninth Circuit stated
that "[a] good -faith belief in the merit of a legal argument is an objective condition which a
competent attorney attains only after reasonable inquiry." Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 831.
104 Zaldivar, 780 F.2(1 at 831.
1 °' Id.
394	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 27:385
sensitivity by the court,'" In making such a determination, at least two district courts
have concluded that an argument that ignores relevint contrary authority of which the
litigant knows or should know cannot constitute a good-faith argument for legal
change.'" These courts have suggested that if a reasonable inquiry would have disclosed
relevant law, a good-faith argument for change must cite and distinguish the law, or cite
the law and argue for a modification.'"
3. Not Improperly Interposed
Under the current rule, a litigant's signature certifies that "the paper has not been
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation." 169 This language is more expansive
than that of the old rule, which proscribed only delay."° Courts have applied Rule 1 l's
motivational prong objectively by examining the circumstances surrounding the paper's
submission to decide whether the paper was intended to harass."' to delay," 2 or to waste
judicial resources.'" For example, in the 1984 case of WSB Electric v. Rank & File
Committee to Stop the 2 -Gate System,'" the plaintiff filed a complaint based on defendant's
picketing of plaintiff's jobsite." 6 The United States District Court for the Northern
District of California noted that the plaintiff could have sought immediate injunctive
relief in state court, and that the plaintiff had pursued discovery of sensitive and
"marginally relevant matters." 16 The court stated that these circumstances raised a strong
inference that the plaintiff sought to harass the defendant rather than to secure relief
against picketing." 7
 The court granted defendant's Rule II motion for attorneys' fees
in the amount of $6,125. 18
Rule 11's three prongs function independently and a person can violate Rule 11 by
signing a paper in violation of any one of the prongs.' 19 When deciding if a paper violates
the motivational prong because it has been improperly interposed, however, the courts
1 °6 Blake, 607 F. Supp. at 192. The advisory committee note to Rule 11 states that the rule is
not intended to chill an attorney's creativity or enthusiasm in pursuing factual or legal theories.
FED. R. CR% P. 11 advisory committee note.
107 See Blake, 607 F. Supp. at 191-92; Gallen Eagle, 103 F.R.D. at 128-29.
1 °8 See Blake, 607 F. Supp. at 192; Golden Eagle, 103 F.R.D. at 128-29.
1°9
 FED. R. Civ. P. I I. See supra note 6 for the text of current. Rule I I.
"° Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 11 with Fed. R. Civ. P. 11,28 U.S.C. app. 540-41 (1982).
nt WSB Elec., 103 F.R.D. at 420-21.
" 2 Davis, 765 F.2d at 500.
"' Sanders v. City of Fort Wayne, 616 F. Supp. 467,470-71 (N.D. Ind. 1985).
" 4 103 F.R.D. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
" 5 I d. at 418-19.
"6 1d. at 420-21.
n 7 Id. at 421.
" 8 Id.
19
 For a case in which a court imposed Rule 11 sanctions for a violation of the factual prong,
see United Food & Commercial Workers v. Armour and Co., 106 F.R.D. 345,347-48 (N.D. Cal.
1985) (Rule 11 violated because complaint not well grounded in fact). For a case in which a court
imposed Rule I 1 sanctions for a violation of the legal prong, see Easiway, 762 F.2d at 254 (Rule II
violated because complaint not warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law). For a case in which a court imposed sanctions for a
violation of the motivational prong, see Sanders, 616 F. Supp. at 470-71 (Rule 11 violated because
attempt to relitigate a claim evidenced an intent to waste judicial resources).
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generally consider whether the paper is factually and legally meritless. 120 In Davis, for
example, the defendant's petition for removal to federal court was factually and legally
unwarranted. 121 The Davis court noted that the petition's lack of plausibility, combined
with defendant's financial incentive to delay, justified an inference of improper pur-
pose. 122
C. Violating the New Standard of Conduct: Circumstances to be Weighed
The advisory committee note to the current rule states that courts should consider
certain factors when deciding whether a litigant has violated the new standard of rea-
sonableness under the circumstances.' 23 According to the advisory committee, when
assessing the reasonableness of the inquiry, a court may consider: how much time a
signer had for investigation; 124 whether the signer had to rely on a client for factual
information;' 25 whether the paper was based on a plausible legal theory; 126 and whether
the signer relied on another attorney.'" Courts in recent decisions have weighed these
and other factors.'"
One case in which a court considered the time available for research to be a factor
was Pudlo v. Director, I.R.S., decided in 1984. 129 In Pudlo, the plaintiff filed a petition to
quash an I.R.S. summons within twenty days of receiving notice.' 3° The relevant statute
required filing of such a petition not later than twenty days after notice is given. 131
Plaintiff interpreted the statute to mean twenty days after receipt of notice.'" Recent
court decisions had held that a petition must be filed within twenty days after the issuance
of notice, which made plaintiff's filing one day late,'" The United States District Court
12° Davis, 765 F.2d at 500; McLaughlin, 603 F. Supp. at 982.
121 Davis, 765 F.2d at 500.
122 m.
122 FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note. The advisory note states:
The rule is not intended to chill an attorney's enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing
factual or legal theories. The court is expected to avoid using the wisdom of hindsight
and should test the signer's conduct by inquiring what was reasonable to believe at the
time the pleading, motion, or other paper was submitted. Thus, what constitutes a
reasonable inquiry may depend on such factors as how much time for investigation
was available to the signer; whether he had to rely on a client for information as to
the facts underlying the pleading, motion, or other paper; whether the pleading,
motion, or other paper was based on a plausible view of the law; or whether he
depended on forwarding counsel or another member of the bar.
Id.
124 Id .
' 23 Id.
126 Id.
1 " Id. The advisory committee note suggests that a court may consider whether an attorney
had to rely on a client for factual, but not legal, information. Id. See also Blake, 607 F. Supp. at 193;
Weir v. Lehman Newspapers, Inc:, 105 F.R.D. 574, 576 (D. Colo. 1985).
I " See, e.g., Pudlo, 587 F. Supp. at 1011-12 (court considered the amount of time available for
investigation); Leema Enter., Inc. v. Willi, 582 F. Supp. 255, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (court considered
the complexity of the law).
129 587 F. Supp. 1010 (N.D. 111. 1984).
' 30 1d. at 1010-12.
' 3 ' Id. at 1012.
"2 Id.
i 95 Id. at 1010, 1012.
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for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed plaintiff's petition, but refused to impose
Rule 11 sanctions.'" The court reasoned that the statute could he interpreted in either
way, and that the cases clarifying the statute's meaning were very recent)" Furthermore,
according to the district court, the twenty-day timetable made it difficult to conduct a
thorough inquiry. 136 The court held that plaintiff's inquiry was reasonable under these
circumstances; therefore, the plaintiff satisfied Rule 1 l's objective test.'"
Other courts have examined a person's status, legal expertise, and resources when
assessing the reasonableness of his or her inquiry.'" For example, in two recent cases,
district courts considered a party's pro se status when deciding whether he had violated
the rule, and held the unrepresented party to a less stringent standard.'" Similarly, an
attorney's expertise may be a relevant factor for a court to consider.'" One court has
suggested that a specialist in a particular area of law may have to conduct a more
exacting inquiry than a novice) ." Moreover, an attorney who has access to computerized
research tools may have to conduct a more thorough and up-to-date inquiry." 2
Whether an inquiry is reasonable also may depend upon the complexity and clarity
of the law in the relevant area.'" if the law in a particular area is confusing or compli-
cated, litigants and courts may experience difficulty in identifying and applying the
controlling law. Consequently, a litigant may reach an incorrect conclusion even after
reasonable inquiry. 144 In such a case, a court may be unwilling to find a Rule 11 viola-
tion.'" For example, in the 1984 case of Leona Enterprises, Inc. v. the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed a complaint against
a Swiss bank for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue,'" but the court found
no Rule 11 violation.'" The court held that the hank's passive maintenance of four
correspondent accounts did not constitute the minimum contacts necessary to satisfy due
process) 49 The court also held that venue was improper.'" Nevertheless, the court noted
Id. at 1011, 1012.
' 35 Id. at 1011-12.
"" Id. at 1012.
"7 .1d. at 1011-12.
0,
 See, e.g., Hilgeford v. People's Bank, Portland, Indiana, 607 F. Supp. 536, 537 (N.D. Ind:
1985), aff 'd , 776 F.2d 176, 179 (7th Cir. 1985); Johnson v. United States, 607 F. Supp. 347, 349
(E.D. Pa. 1985); Blake, 607 F. Supp. at 192.
199 Hilgeford, 607 F. Supp. at 537; j (Anson, 607 F. Supp. at 349. The courts hold unrepresented
parties to a less stringent standard. The standard, however, is objective, and courts impose sanctions
when the inquiry' that a reasonable unrepresented party would make would reveal no basis for the
paper. Johnson, 607 F. Supp. at 349-50 (plaintiff's use of form petition identical to petitions used
in cases whose holdings contradicted plaintiff's position demonstrated a lack of reasonable inquiry).
140
 See Blake, 607 F. Supp. at 192.
14 ' See Heuttig Schromm v. Landscape Contractors Council, 582 F. Supp. 1519, 1522 (N.D.
Cal. 1984) (because counsel, a specialist in labor law, brought a meritless labor claim, strong inference
of improper purpose arises).
"g See Golden Eagle, 103 F.R.D. at 129 (if attorney has access to Lexis, failure to use Lexis may
not constitute reasonable inquiry).
'" See, e.g., Robinson v. C.R. Laurence Co., Inc., 105 F.R.D. 567. 568 (D. Colo. 1985); Blake,
607 F. Supp. at 192; Leema Enter., Inc. v. Willi, 582 F. Supp. 255, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
"4 See Leema, 582 F. Supp. at 257.
1" Id.
I " 582 F. Supp. 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
1 4 7
 Id. at 256.
"g Id. at 257.
"9 Id,
' 5° Id. at 256.
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that the jurisprudence of personal jurisdiction is an occasionally confusing and complex
area of the law.""' Because of the confusion and complexity, the court was unable to
find that the complaint lacked a reasonable legal basis.'"
Like time, litigant expertise, and complexity of law, mistake is a circumstance that
courts may weigh when interpreting Rule 11) 53 If a mistake might have occurred despite
reasonable inquiry, a court may be reluctant to find a Rule I I violation. 15 ' For example,
in the 1985 case of Baranski v. Serhani,' 55 the plaintiffs' attorneys filed complaints which
advanced claims on behalf of forty-six plaintiffs.° Because eight of these claims were
time-barred, attorneys for the defendant moved for Rule II sanctions for failure to
conduct a reasonable inquiry into the facts and law.'" Plaintiffs' attorneys corrected the
error immediately, and argued that the mistake was inadvertent and undeserving of
Rule 11 sanctions.'" The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
held that imposing sanctions for an inadvertent error would be inconsistent with Rule
II, which seeks to deter abusive pleading and motion practices.'" The court noted that
the lawsuit was large and complex, that oversights are inevitable, and that even the
defendants' attorneys did not recognize the error immediately.'" The court thus sug-
gested that the mistake might have occurred despite a reasonable inquiry, and that
inadvertent mistakes should not automatically trigger Rule I I sanctions."'
Mistake, however, is not always a defense against a Rule 11 motion. In the 1984
case of Weisman v. Rivlin,' 62 plaintiff's attorney mistakenly assumed that his client was
incorporated in Maryland, the state of its headquarters, when in fact it was incorporated
in Delaware.'" The plaintiff filed in United States District Court for the District of
Columbia,, based solely on diversity jurisdiction.' 64 Because diversity of citizenship was
the only basis for federal jurisdiction, the court held that plaintiff's counsel had a duty
to undertake a reasonable inquiry into the question of diversity. 1i5 Because, in this
instance, a reasonable inquiry would have revealed the lack of diversity, the court found
that mistake was no excuse, and imposed sanctions under Rule 11. 16" Thus, as the
Baranski and Weisman decisions indicate, mistake is a circumstance courts can weigh in
deciding whether to invoke Rule 11, and an inadvertent error does not violate the rule
if a reasonable inquiry might not have revealed or prevented the error.' 67
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, no two cases share identical circumstances.
Yet, the discussion also demonstrates that the standard of conduct under Rule 11 remains
the same for each case: a standard of reasonableness under the particular circum-
15 ' ld. at 257.
[52 Id.
I" See Baranski v. Sedum, 106 F.R.D. 247,249-50 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
' 54 Id.
155 106 F.R.D. 247 (N.D. 111. 1985).
156 /d. at 249.
1 " Id.
1 " Id.
1 " Id. at 250.
16" Id. at 249,250.
I"' Id. at 250.
162 598 F. Stipp. 724 (1).1).C. 1984).
163 Id.
' 61 Id. at 725.
'"5 Id. at 726.
16" Id. The court imposed a sanction of two hundred dollars on plaintiff's attorney. Id.
'" Compare Baranski, 106 F.R.D. at 249-50, with Weisman, 598 F. Stipp. at 726.
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stances.'" As the advisory committee note indicates, the current standard is stricter than
the good-faith standard of the former rule, and it is expected "that a greater range of
circumstances will trigger its violation." 366 The current standard is more demanding
because the attorney or party must conduct an objectively reasonable inquiry into the
facts and the law, and must certify that the paper is not improperly interposed."°
Moreover, the duty of reasonable inquiry is continuous; it survives the filing of the
paper. 17 ' That is, the signer must continually reassess his or her position because an
uncritical pursuit of a once meritorious position may not constitute reasonable inquiry.'"
Thus, under the current rule, by signing a paper, an attorney or party assumes a
continuing obligation of objective, reasonable inquiry regarding the facts and law, and
certifies that the paper is properly motivated.
III. ENFORCEMENT OF THE NEW STANDARD: SANCTIONS
A. The Mandatory Nature of Sanctions
The 1983 amendment to Rule 11 changed not only the standard of conduct from
a subjective one to an objective one of reasonableness under the circumstances, but also
changed the method of enforcing the standard of conduct."' Under the old rule,
sanctions were completely discretionary.' 74
 The former rule did not direct courts to
impose sanctionsP and courts rarely imposed them.' 76
Rule 11, as amended, requires courts to sanction infractions.'" The rule's language
is imperative. For example, if a signed paper violates the rule, the court "shall impose
168
 FED. R. Civ. P. I I advisory committee note. See supra text accompanying notes 35-57.
' 69 FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note.
' 7° See id, See also supra text accompanying notes 35-122.
17 ' See Erie Conduit Corp., 106 F.R.D. at 457 n.9; Woodfork By and Through Houston v. Gavin,
105 F.R.D. 100, 104 (N.D. Miss. 1985). See also supra text accompanying notes 58-61.
12 See Woodfork, 105 F.R.D. at 104.
'" Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 11 with Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 28 U.S.C. app. 540-41 (1982). See supra
note 6 for the text of current Rule 11. See supra note 14 for the text of former Rule 11.
' 74 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 28 U.S.C. app. 540-41 (1982). The former rule stated:
If a pleading is not signed or is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of this rule,
it may be stricken as sham and false and the action may proceed as though the pleading
had not been served. For a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected
to appropriate disciplinary action. Similar action may be taken if scandalous or indecent
matter is inserted.
Id. See supra note 14 for the complete text of former Rule 11.
"5
 Fed. R. Civ. P. II, 28 U.S.C. app. 540-41 (1982). See supra note 14 for the complete text
of former Rule II.
' 76 See Risinger, Some Striking Problems, supra note 16, at 34-38; Schwarzer, supra note 4, at 183.
177 FED. R. Civ. P. 11. The current rule states in pertinent part:
If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is
signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or rnovant.
If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court,
upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it,
a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to
pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred
because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.
Id. See supra note 6 for the complete text of current Rule 11.4
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... an appropriate sanction ...." 178 Because sanctions now are mandatory, a district
court may commit error by failing to impose sanctions on an individual who violates
Rule 11.' 79 In the 1985 case of Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc.,'" for example, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that the district court
erred in not invoking Rule 11 sanctions.' 8 ' In Westmoreland, defendant CBS obtained a
subpoena to depose former Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard Helms, a
nonparty witness.'" The subpoena was silent as to the manner of recording the depo-
sition.'" When Helms arrived at the defendant's offices, CBS announced its intention
to videotape his deposition.'" Although he was willing to testify before a stenographer,
Helms refused to be videotaped.' 89 Theorizing that the subpoena was a court order
compelling Helms to testify, CBS petitioned the court to hold Helms in contempt instead
of moving the court to order videotaping as prescribed by rule 30(b)(4).' 88 In rejecting
CBS's reasoning,' 87 the district court treated•the petition as a request for a Rule 30(b)(4)
order to require videotaping, which it denied.'" The court of appeals reversed, holding
that because CBS's contempt petition lacked a reasonable factual and legal basis, the
district court erred in not sanctioning CBS as required under Rule 11. 189
B. Appropriateness of Sanctions
Although sanctions are mandatory upon a Rule 11 violation, 19° the rule requires
that the sanctions imposed in a particular case he "appropriate." 19 ' The rule states that
a court should not strike an unsigned paper unless the litigant fails to sign it promptly
upon learning of the omission. 192 Similarly, Rule 11 stipulates that a court may award
expenses and attorneys' fees incurred because of the violation, but the amount awarded
must be reasonable.' 93 The advisory committee note to Rule II indicates that to ensure
"8 FED. R. Civ. P. 11. The advisory committee note emphasizes the mandatory nature of the
sanction by stating that "... the words 'shall impose' . . . focus the court's attention on the need to
impose sanctions for pleading and motion abuses." FED. R. Cm P. 11 advisory committee note.
Furthermore, the rule authorizes a court to impose sanctions on its own initiative. FED. R. Civ. P.
11.
' 79 Westmoreland, 770 F.2d at 1174-75, See also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hand, 763 F.2d 1184,
1187 (10th Cir. 1985) (the court noted that Rule 11 states that a court shall impose an appropriate
sanction upon finding a violation); Eastway, 762 F.2d at 254 n.7 (the court noted that the rule's
drafters meant to stress the mandatory nature of sanctions, and stated that upon finding a violation
a district court must fashion a proper sanction).
' 8" 770 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
181 Id. at 1174-75.
' 82 Id. at 1170-71.
183 Id. at 1171.
I" Id.
Id.
186 Id. (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(4)).
187 Id. at 1171.
188 Id.
'" Id. at 1177-78.
' 9° See FED. R. CIV. P. 11. See supra note 6 for the text of current Rule 11.
191 FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
192 Id,
193 Id.
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that the sanction is appropriate or reasonable, a court should tailor the sanction to fit
the circumstances of the case. 194
The courts are tailoring sanctions by various means.I 95
 Although the rule speaks in
terms of the paper as a whole, 196 several courts have sanctioned only those claims or
parts of a paper that are factually, legally, or motivationally unwarranted.' 97 For example,
in Mohammed v. Union Carbide corp.,199 the plaintiff filed a fourteen-count complaint
against several defendants.'" In April, 1984, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on one
of plaintiff's counts, a defamation claim. 2" In October, 1984, the court granted defen-
dant's motion for summary judgment on the remaining claims. 20 ' Defendant moved for
expenses and attorneys' fees incurred defending against plaintiff's entire complaint. 202
The court found that only plaintiff's defamation claim violated Rule 11. 2" Therefore,
the court held that defendant was not entitled to the entire amount of expenses and
fees incurred defending against the complaint, 201 but was only entitled to expenses and
Fees incurred in the litigation until April, 1984, when the court granted summary
judgment on the defamation claim. 2" The court also allowed plaintiff twenty days in
which to file objections to defendant's itemized statement of expenses and fees. 2°6
Similarly, several recent cases indicate that courts also tailor Rule 11 sanctions by
imposing reasonable, rather than actual, expenses and fees on a party found guilty of
violating Rule 11. 207 Thus, a party who prevails on a Rule 11 motion for expenses and
fees may not be entitled to actual expenses and fees incurred due to the violation,
because those expenses and fees may not be reasonable. 208 Furthermore, two recent cases
indicate that there is a duty to mitigate those costs. 2" For example, in the 1985 case of
1°4 FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee note.
' 95 See, e.g., Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., Inc., 771 F.2d 194. 205 (7th Cir. 1985). aff'g 596
F. Supp. 13 (N.D. 111. 1984); Mohammed v. Union Carbide Corp., 606 F. Supp. 252. 262 (E.D.
Mich. 1985).
196 See FED. R. Civ. P. 11. The advisory committee note states that the rule is intended to lessen
frivolous claims and defenses. FED. R. Civ. P. 1 l advisory committee note.
197 Rodgers, 771 F.2d at 205-06; Fleming Sales Co. v. Bailey, 611 F. Supp. 507, 520 (N.D. Ill.
1985); Mohammed, 606 F. Supp. at 261-62. In Rodgers, the court required plaintiff's attorney to pay
one-third of the expenses and fees incurred by the defendant in dismissing the complaint. Rodgers,
771 F.2d at 205. The court concluded that this amount represented the cost of defending against
the complaint's meritless claims. Id. Rut see Martinez, Inc. v. H. Landau & Co., 107 F.R.D. 775, 777-
78 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (court suggests that Rule 11 applies only to a paper as a whole and not to the
severable claims within a paper).
198 606 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
199 Id. at 254.
299 Id. at 256.
201 Id.
2u2 Id. at 259-60.
"5 /d. at 262.
244 Id.
205 id.
2°6 Id. at 263.
207 See, e.g., United Food, 106 F.R.D. at 349, 350; Weisman, 598 F. Supp. at 726-27.
201' See United Food & Commercial Workers v. Armour and Co., 106 F.R.D. 345, 349, 350 (N.D.
Cal. 1985). See also Taylor v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 594 F. Supp. 226, 228 (N.D.N.Y. 1984)
(hours of work by counsel exceeded what was necessary, and some of counsel's work was duplicative),
off'd, 751 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1985).
219
 See United Food, 106 F.R.D. at 349-50; Weisman, 598 F. Supp. at 726.
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United Food & Commercial Workers v. Armour and Co., 210 plaintiffs filed a factually unwar-
ranted complaint, 211 but the court concluded that the defendant could have mitigated
its costs by informing the court of the complaint's meritlessness more quickly and easily
than it did.212 In holding that defendant had a duty to mitigate its costs, the court
asserted:
The duty is one of mitigation; it rests on the concept that the victim of a
frivolous lawsuit must use reasonable means to terminate the litigation and
to prevent the costs of that frivolous suit from bedoming excessive. if a party
eventually wins Rule I I sanctions, but has failed to use the least expensive
route to early resolution, the court may rule that not all the expenses the
successful party incurred in making formal motions were reasonable attor-
ney's fees that should be awarded under rule 11. 215
According to the court, the defendant could have requested a status conference or a
telephone status conference with the court and the plaintiffs. 211 The court then might
have resolved the lawsuit without the formal motion and hearing for summary judgment
that ensued. 215 Moreover, the court noted that if a conference had failed to resolve the
dispute, the defendant could have moved for summary judgment. 216 Consequently, the
court awarded the defendant $7,500 in attorney's fees instead of the $22,046.68 the
defendant had requested. 217
Another factor that may influence a court's choice of an appropriate sanction is the
litigant's state of mind or intent. 218 Although a litigant's mental state is irrelevant when
determining whether he or she violated Rule 11, 219 the advisory committee note reveals
that willfulness is relevant in selecting a sanction. 22° The courts are heeding this admo-
nition by considering the conduct of the attorney or party who violated the rule when
choosing a sanction."' For example, in Stevens v. Lawyers Mutual Liability Insurance Co. of
North Carolina, 222 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina found that a complaint was "clearly meritless." 223 Although the complaint
510 106 F.R.D. 345 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
2'1
	 at 347-48.
217 Id. at '349-50.
213 Id. at 350 .
2 14 Id. at 349.
215 Id.
216 1d. at 350.
2 " Id. at 346, 350.
2" See, e.g., Stevens v. Lawyers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of North Carolina, 107 F.R.D. 112, 116
(E.D.N.C. 1985).
219 Id. See supra notes 15-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of the old subjective test
and the new objective test.
220 FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note. The advisory note states:
The reference in the former text to willfulness as a prerequisite to disciplinary action
has been deleted. Howdver, in considering the nature and severity of the sanctions to
be imposed, the court should take account of the state of the attorney's or party's
actual or presumed knowledge when the pleading or other paper was signed.
Id.
251 See, e.g., Stevens, 107 F.R.D. at 116; Weisman, 598 F. Supp. at 727. See also Pudlo, 587 F. Supp.
at 1012.
222 107 F.R.D. 112 (E.D.N.C. 1985).
255 Id. at 114.
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indicated that plaintiff had not satisfied Rule 11's reasonable inquiry requirement, the
court found that the plaintiff had not filed his claim deceitfully or in bad faith .224 Under
the circumstances, the court decided that a formal reprimand constituted an appropriate
sanction. 225
While Stevens indicates that a litigant's intention in filing a paper may influence
sanction selection, 226 a litigant's conduct before or after filing the paper may also influ-
ence the court.'" For example, in Weisman v. Rivlin, 228 the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia noted that the plaintiff had attempted to settle the case
before filing his complaint. 229 The court reasoned that the effort to settle demonstrated
that the complaint, though legally unwarranted, was not interposed for an improper
purpose.'" The court considered this circumstance relevant to its choice of an appro-
priate sanction. 231
C. Whom to Sanction: Attorney or Client
When selecting an appropriate sanction, a court may sanction the signer, or a
represented party, or both.'" Therefore, the court may reach beyond the attorney who
signs a paper to sanction a client responsible for the violation. 233 In the 1985 case of
Chevron v. Hand, 234 the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld a
district court decision sanctioning the client rather than the signing attorney. 235 In
Chevron, the litigants had entered into a stipulation agreement dismissing their lawsuit. 236
One of the defendants, after having agreed to the stipulation, hired a new attorney to
move to set aside the agreement. 237 The court found that the defendant's purpose was
merely to delay the implementation of the agreement. 2" The court then sanctioned the
defendant, rather than the signing attorney, because the defendant was the "catalyst
behind this frivolous motion."'"
Although Rule 11 states that a court may sanction a represented party who does
not sign a paper, 2" the rule does not provide for sanctioning an attorney who does not
sign, even if that attorney is responsible for preparing the paper. 21 ' At least one court,
224 Id. at 116.
228 Id.
226 ,rd.
227
	 e.g., Weisman, 598 F. Supp. at 727; Pudic, 587 F. Supp. at 1012.
228 598 F. Supp. 724 (D.D.C. 1984).
2" Id. at 727.
23o Id.
231 Id.
282 FED. R. CR% P. 11. See supra note 6 for the text of current Rule 11.
233
	 R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
234 763 F.2d 1184 (10th Cir. 1985).
238 Id. at 1187.
238 Id. at 1186.
237
"8 Id.
299
	 at 1187.
240 FED. R. Qv. P. 11. See supra note 6 for the text of current Rule 11.
24 ' See FED. R. Civ. P. 11. Rule 11 states that if a paper violates the rule the court shall sanction
"the person who signed it, a represented party, or both ...." Id. See also Rodgers, 596 F. Supp. at
28 (court refused to sanction an attorney because the attorney had participated in the case but had
not signed the defective pleading).
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however, has assessed fees against the attorney responsible for preparing a paper, al-
though that attorney did not sign it. 242 The court also sanctioned the local counsel who
signed the paper by criticizing him for his neglect. 243
In summary, the current Rule 11, as written and applied, enforces its new standard
of conduct by requiring courts to impose appropriate sanctions upon persons responsible
for violating its provisions. 244 Although sanctions are mandatory upon a violation, 2" the
courts are imposing appropriate sanctions by tailoring the sanctions to fit the circum-
stances of the individual case. 246 Most courts are sanctioning only those elements of a
paper that violate the rule."' Similarly, courts are assessing reasonable fees and expen-
ses,248 are imposing a duty to mitigate upon the party who moves for Rule I 1 sanctions, 249
and are considering whether the violation was willful when selecting a sanction. 255 Finally,
the courts are attempting to sanction the party responsible for the violation. 25 '
IV. DETERRING ABUSES AND STREAMLINING LITIGATION WITHOUT STIFLING
CREATIVE. AND ZEALOUS ADVOCACY
Rule 11's purpose is to deter improper litigation tactics and to streamline litigation
by decreasing meritless claims and defenses. 252 The authors of Rule 11, however, antic-
ipated that courts might misapply the rule. 253 Thus, the advisory committee note cautions
that Rule 11 is not intended to chill the enthusiasm or creativity sometimes needed to
pursue novel factual or legal theories. 254 Since 1983, when Rule 11 was amended, federal
courts, and litigants, have used the rule frequently. 255 By examining the decisions handed
down by the courts since the rule's amendment, this section will attempt to determine
the effect that the amended rule has had on the legal community. This section will
conclude that the cases interpreting the rule since its amendment in 1983 indicate that
Rule 11 has furthered the purpose of deterring abuses and streamlining litigation without
stifling creative and zealous advocacy.
242 Golden Eagle, 103 F.R.D. at 125 n.l. One commentator contends that the rule's purpose is
to sanction the person responsible for the violation, regardless of who signed the paper. Schwarzer,
supra note 4, at 185.
24 ' Golden Eagle, 103 F.R.D. at 125 n.l.
244
	
FED. R. CR,. P. 11. See supra text accompanying notes 177-89.
248 FED. R. Crv. P. 11. See Westmoreland, 770 F.2d at 1174.
246 See, e.g., Rodgers, 771 F.2d at 205-06; Mohammed, 606 F. Supp. at 262. See supra text
accompanying notes 191-231.
297 See, e.g., Rodgers, 771 F.2d at 205; Mohammed, 606 F. Supp. at 261-62.
248 See, e.g., United Food, 106 F.R.D. at 349; Weisman, 598 F. Supp. at 726-27.
249 See United Food, 106 F.R.D. at 350.
"° See Weisman, 598 F. Supp. at 727. See also Stevens, 107 F.R.D. at 116.
28 ' See, e.g., Chevron, 763 F.2d at 1187; Gilmer v. City of Cleveland, 617 F. Supp. 985,988 (N.D.
Ohio 1985); Golden Eagle, 103 F.R.D. at 125 n.l.
252 FED. R. CIV. P. 11; FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note.
253
	
R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note.
254
2" See, e.g., Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1985); United Food &
Commercial Workers v. Armour and Co., 106 F.R.D. 345 (N.D. Cal. 1985); Woodfork By and
Through Houston v. Gavin, 105 F.R.D. 100 (N.D. Miss. 1985); Florida Monument Builders v. All
Faiths Mem. Gardens, 605 F. Supp. 1324 (S.D. Fla. 1984); Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv. Inc.,
596 F. Supp. 13 (N.D. Ill. 1984), aff'd, 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985).
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Two misapplication problems might arise in the courts' use of the current rule.
First, courts could misuse Rule 11 by misapplying the reasonable inquiry requirement. 256
The reasonable inquiry requirement enables courts to find violations by providing an
objective standard to which a signer must conform. 2" The standard is flexible: courts
must be able to adapt it to different circumstances. 258
 Thus, courts must be sensitive to
the circumstances surrounding the signing of the paper in order to determine whether
the inquiry was reasonable. 299
 For example, a court can only decide whether a signer
violated the legal prong of Rule 11 by determining whether a reasonable inquiry would
have revealed that the paper was warranted by existing law or by a good-faith argument
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing i.aw.260 Because it is flexible,
however, courts might misapply the standard by failing to weigh the relevant circum-
stances. If a court ignores or discounts the circumstances and demands too much inquiry,
then the court may sanction litigants for making a legal argument that should be
protected by the rule. The line between creative, innovative legal argument and frivolity
is particularly fine. 26 '
Second, courts could misuse Rule 11 by misapplying the rule's sanctions. When a
court finds a violation, a sanction is mandatory. 262
 Moreover, Rule 1 1 grants a court great
discretion in selecting the sanction. Nevertheless, the use of the words "appropriate"
and '!reasonable" 263
 indicate that the sanction must fit the circumstances of the individual
case. 264
 For example, an award of expenses or attorneys' fees must be reasonable under
the circumstances. 265
 If courts sanction litigants unjustifiably or excessively, they may
inhibit advocacy and impede a determination on the merits by deterring meritorious
claims and acceptable pleading and motion practices.
An examination of the nascent Rule 11 jurisprudence indicates, however, that the
federal courts have applied the current rule sensitively in accordance with its purpose. 266
Courts have recognized that litigants are responsible for conducting an objectively rea-
sonable inquiry into the factual and legal bases of each paper, and have recognized that
the paper's purpose must be proper. 267
 Nevertheless, the courts have carefully weighed
the relevant circumstances to determine whether litigants have satisfied the rule. 268
Time,269 litigant expertise, 2" resources available, 271
 complexity of law, 272 and inadvertent
256
 See, e.g., Rothschild, Fenton, & Swanson, Rule 11: Stop, Think and Investigate, 2 LITIGATION
13,13-14 (1985); Snyder, The Chill of Rule 11, 2 LITIGATION 16,55 (1985).
257 See Westmoreland, 770 F.2d at 1174-75; Fastway, 762 F.2d at 253-54.
258 See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note.
ng See id.
265
 FED. R. Civ. P. 11. See supra note 6 for the text of current Rule 11.
26 ' Snyder, supra note 256, at 55.
262 FED. R. Crv. P. 11. See supra note 6 for the text of current Rule 11.
263
 FED. R. Civ. P. 11. See supra note 6 for the text of current Rule 11.
264 FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note.
265
 See, e.g., United Food, 106 F.R:D. at 349.
266
 See, e.g., Mohammed, 606 F. Supp. at 261-62; Pudlo, 587 F. Supp. at 1011-12; Leema, 582 F.
Supp. at.257,	 •
267
 See, e.g., Westmoreland, 770 F.2d at 1174-75; Davis, 765 F.2d at 498-500. See supra text
accompanying notes 35-122.
266 See, e.g., Baranski, 106 F.R.D. at 249-50; Pudlo, 587 F. Supp. at 1011-12_ See supra text
accompanying notes 123-67.
269 See Pudic), 587 F. Supp. at 1011-12.
270 See Blake, 607 F. Supp. at 192.
27 ' See Golden Eagle, 103 F.R.D. at 129.
2" See Leema, 582 F. Supp. at 257.
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error275 are among the circumstances that courts have considered when deciding whether
a litigant violated Rule 11. The courts' weighing of these factors indicates a willingness
to consider the circumstances of the individual case when determining whether an
inquiry is reasonable or a motive is proper. By using the correct standard of reasonable-
ness under the circumstances of the case, the courts are encouraging litigants to act
responsibly without imposing upon them a standard of behavior that they cannot satisfy.
Similarly, while recognizing that sanctions under Rule I I are mandatory, 27 ' courts
have tailored the sanctions to fit the circumstances of the individual case. 275 The courts
have imposed appropriate sanctions by sanctioning only the parts of a paper that violate
the rule, 27" by imposing reasonable, rather than actual, attorneys' fees, 2" and by sanc-
tioning the party responsible for the violation. 278 Most significantly, perhaps, the courts
have developed a duty to mitigate the costs incurred because of a Rule 11 violation.'"
The party moving for sanctions under the rule must attempt to mitigate his or her costs
by responding to the Rule 11 violation responsibly and expeditiously. 28" The development
and use of this affirmative duty to mitigate indicates that the courts are applying Rule
11 carefully and fairly by imposing sanctions appropriate to the particular case.
Although, if misused, Rule 11 could inhibit creative advocacy, the courts have
applied the rule judiciously, in accordance with its purpose. By carefully weighing the
circumstances before finding a violation or imposing a sanction, the courts are deterring
abusive practices rather than meritorious claims and defenses. This sensitive application
of Rule 11 may expedite litigation and lower its costs while enabling litigants to reach
the merits of their cases."'
CONCLUSION
Rule I I was amended in 1983 because it had failed to deter abuses in the signing
of pleadings. The framers of the current rule intended to make the signer of a paper
accept responsibility for the paper and the consequences of filing it. To accomplish this
task, the framers clarified Rule 11's standard of conduct and its method of ensuring
enforcement of that standard.
Rule 11's new standard of conduct is one of reasonableness under the circumstances.
According to the rule, a signer of a paper must certify that a reasonable inquiry informs
his or her belief that. a paper is well grounded in fact, warranted by existing law or by
a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of law, and that it is
not interposed for any improper purpose. The courts have applied the new standard of
conduct objectively by weighing the circumstances of each case. The courts' basic inquiry
has been whether, under the circumstances, a competent attorney or litigant could
reasonably believe that his or her paper is factually, legally, and motivationally warranted.
279
	 Baranski, 106 F.R.D. at 250.
274 See, e.g., Westmoreland, 770 F.2(1 at 1174-75; Chevron, 763 F.2d at 1187.
275 See, e.g., Stevens, 107 F.R.D. at 116; United Food, 106 F. R. D. at 349-50; Weisman, 598 F. Supp.
at 726. See supra text accompanying notes 101-231.
27" See Mohammed, 606 F. Supp. at 262.
2" See United Food, 106 F. R. D. a' 349,350.
178
	
Chevron, 763 F.2t1 at 1187; Golden Eagle, 103 F.R.D. at 125.
2" See United Food, 106 F.R.D. at 349-50; Weisman, 598 F. Supp. at 726.
2g" See United Food, 106 ERA). at 350.
281 See generally Millet -, The Adversary System, supra note 4, at 30-3]; Comment, Deterring Dilatory
Tactics in Litigation: Proposed Amendments to Rules 7 and 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 26
Sr. Louis U.L.J. 895,912-13 (1982).
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Rule 11 provides for enforcement of the new standard of conduct by mandating
that courts sanction litigants who violate the rule. Sanctions are mandatory, and a district
court may commit error by failing to impose a sanction on an individual who violates
the rule's provisions. While it mandates sanctions, Rule 11 also requires that sanctions
be appropriate. The courts are imposing appropriate sanctions by tailoring the sanctions
to fit the circumstances of the individual case.
Although its purpose is to deter abuses and to streamline litigation, Rule 11, if
misapplied, might inhibit zealous, creative advocacy and prevent litigants from reaching
the merits of their cases. The nascent Rule I I jurisprudence indicates, however, that the
federal courts are applying the objective standard of reasonableness by carefully weighing
the circumstances of the case and by tailoring sanctions to fit those circumstances. The
courts' judicious application of Rule I I should help to secure the speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action on the merits by deterring irresponsible litigation tactics
without stifling enthusiastic and creative advocacy.
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